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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 782-(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Utah Liability Reform Act (Utah Code Ann. 78-27-37

et seq.) abrogated the doctrine of implied indemnity and whether the trial court erred in
finding that defendants/appellees Stewart's were entitled to indemnity , rather than
permitting plaintiff/appellant Schaerrer to have a jury allocate fault among the parties
pursuant to the Act.
Standard of Review: The trial court ruling as to whether the Liability
Reform Act applies to the facts of this case is a question of law to be reviewed to de
novo. Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 319 (Utah 1999).
Issue preserved in trial court: Record at 1095-97; 1175, pg. 20:9-23:1.
2.

If the doctrine of implied indemnity survived enactment of the

Liability Reform Act, whether the Court erred in granting summary judgment, based
upon its finding that Stewart's was entitled to indemnification from PCCA as a matter of
law for damages caused to plaintiff by the drug Fenfluramine.
Standard of Review: The trial court's ruling on a grant of summary
judgment is reviewed for correctness. Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205, 1207
(Utah 1999).
Issue preserved in trial court: Record at 1097-99; 1175, pg. 18:4-19:11,
1144-46.

S:\WordProc\FEN\795\033 795.doc
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STATUTE WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS CENTRAL TO THIS APPEAL
Utah Code Ann. 78-27-37 to 78-27-42 (set forth in full in Addendum
No. 1).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE,
This is a products liability action for damages suffered by plaintiff and

appellant Jeanne Schaerrer ("Schaerrer") for injuries caused by her ingestion of the diet
drug Fenfluramine, which she took in combination with Phentermine (a combination
commonly known as "fen-phen"). Schaerrer alleges that, as a result of her ingestion of
fenfluramine, she suffered severe heart damage requiring open-heart surgery to repair two
of her heart valves. The defendants named in Schaerrer's lawsuit were:
A.

American Home Products Corporation, A.H. Robbins Company, Inc.

and Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, Inc. (collectively the "AHP Defendants"). The AHP
Defendants manufactured, marketed and sold fenfluramine in the form of 20 mg
Pondimin tablets. Schaerrer ingested Pondimin, and alleges that this drug caused or
contributed to her injuries;
B.

Appellees Stewart Koeven, R.PH. and Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy

(collectively referred to as "Stewart's"). Stewart's created, marketed and sold a
combination fenfluramine-phentermine capsule. Schaerrer ingested Stewart's
combination capsule, and alleges that this product caused or contributed to her injuries;
C.

Jeffrey Johnson, M.D., the doctor who prescribed fenfluramine and

phentermine to Schaerrer; and
D.

Professional Compounding Centers of America, Inc. ("PCCA").

PCCA was a pharmaceutical and pharmacy supply wholesaler, which supplied the raw

S:\WordProc\FEN\795\033 795.doc
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fenfluramine powder used by Stewart's in creating the combination fenfluramine phentermine capsule.
Schaerrer's claims against all defendants, other than Stewart's, have been
settled or otheiwise dismissed.
II.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
Schaerrer's complaint was filed on December 10, 1998, against the

defendants identified above. (Record at 31.) Schaerrer settled her claims against PCCA,
and PCCA was dismissed with prejudice from this action on February 22, 2000. (Record
at 509.) (Pertinent provisions of the PCCA Settlement Agreement and Release are set
forth below.) On August 21, 2000, Dr. Johnson's unopposed motion for summary
judgment was granted, and he was dismissed from the case. (Record at 988.) In
September 2000, Schaerrer settled her claims against the AHP Defendants, and agreed to
dismiss those Defendants with prejudice. On May 15, 2000, Stewart's filed its first of
two motions for summary judgment, contending that it was a non-manufacturing retail
seller of prescription drugs and therefore not subject to strict liability. Schaerrer
countered that Stewart's activities with respect to the manufacture, marketing and sale of
one-a-day fen-phen capsules made Stewart's a manufacturer subject to strict liability, and
precluded it from asserting the immunity to strict products liability claims normally
available to retail pharmacists. On September 1, 2000, the trial court denied Stewart's
motion, finding that there was evidence from which the jury could find that Stewart's
acted as a manufacturer by creating and marketing a product not otherwise available, thus

subjecting it to strict liability. (Record at 1003-08; see also, Addendum, No. 2.) On
October 18, 2000, on Stewart's motion the trial court reconsidered its September 1, 2000
Order and granted "partial summary judgment" to Stewart's, precluding plaintiff from
putting on evidence that the combination of fenfluramine and phentermine by Stewart's
into a single capsule created a more serious risk of harm than using the drugs separately.
(Record at 1057-58.) Stewart's brought a second motion for summary judgment,
contending that it was, as a matter of law, entitled to indemnification by PCCA and that,
pursuant to Schaerrer's settlement with PCCA, her claims should be dismissed. This
motion was granted by the court on January 25, 2001. (Record at 1175). The trial court
entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment dismissing Schaerrer's
claims against Stewart's on April 30, 2001. (Record at 1154-61; see also Addendum,
No. 3.) This appeal followed.
III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
As of June 1995, Jeanne Schaerrer was in good health with no chronic

health problems, other than being overweight. (Record at 869, pg. 14:24-15:2, pg. 16:1524.) In June 1995, she had a discussion with defendant Jeffery Johnson, M.D. about
using medication to help her lose weight. (Id.) Thereafter, Fenfluramine and
Phentermine were prescribed to Schaerrer by Dr. Johnson, and ingested by Schaerrer
during the period from June 1995 through June 1997. (Record at 776-817.)
Schaerrer obtained Fenfluramine from two different sources, each
implicating different defendants. Initially, she had prescriptions filled at Woolsey's

Pharmacy (not a party to this action). (Record at 776-799.) The Fenfluramine product
supplied to Schaerrer by Woolsey's Pharmacy was in the form of 20 milligram Pondimin
(Fenfluramine) tablets manufactured by the AHP Defendants. (Id.) Generic Phentermine
was supplied to Schaerrer by Woolsey's Pharmacy in a separate capsule (id.). The
manufacturers of the generic phentermine capsules supplied by Woolsey's are not parties
to this action. Schaerrer was instructed by Dr. Johnson to take one Pondimin tablet three
times per day and to take one phentermine capsule once per day. (Record at 816, 866,
pg. 71:25-72:10.)
In October 1996, Schaerrer heard from a friend who was employed at a
physician's office (not Dr. Johnson) about a "one-a-day fen-phen capsule" available from
Stewart's. (Record at 701-703.) Schaerrer consulted with Dr. Johnson, who had never
heard of one-a-day fen-phen. (Record at 854, pg. 51:1-52:22.) Nevertheless,
Dr. Johnson prescribed Stewart's compounded fen-phen capsules to Schaerrer at her
request. (Id.) Dr. Johnson testified that he never did any research or independent
investigation regarding the safety and efficacy of Stewart's one-a-day fen-phen capsules.
(Record at 853-854, pg. 52:22-53:14.) Dr. Johnson testified that he assumed that
Stewart's had determined the safety of the one-a-day capsule as compared with the
Pondimin product. (Id.) Schaerrer filled prescriptions at Stewart's for one-a-day fenphen on five separate occasions between November 1996 and June 1997. (Record at
611.) In early L997, Schaerrer began experiencing symptoms of dizziness, nausea and
chest pain. (Record at 863-65.) A few months later, following evaluation by her doctors
it was found that she had suffered severe heart valve damage, requiring open heart

surgery to repair two heart valves. (Record at 859-62.)
In May of 1996, Stewart Koeven invented one-a-day fen-phen capsules, by
combining raw Fenfluramine powder obtained from PCCA, Phentermine powder from
capsules manufactured by other pharmaceutical manufacturers, Methylcellulose (a
purported time released agent) and Lactose (a filler). (Record at 687, 692-693.) Koeven
testified that he developed the product to be taken once daily, to combat what he saw as
patients' lack of compliance with the typically prescribed regimen of fenfluramine three
times a day. (Record at 680, 687-692.) Stewart Koeven performed no testing as to the
safety and efficacy of his product, and as far as he knew, no one had ever prepared or
tested such a product as of May 1996. (Id., also see Record at 846-51.) Prior to
preparing the one-a-day fen-phen capsules, Koeven never consulted any physicians nor
conducted any research regarding the safety or efficacy of his new product. (Id.) Before
receiving a single prescription for compounded fen-phen, Koeven prepared "office use
capsules" which he supplied to local physicians for experimental use on their patients.

04)
There is expert testimony in this matter on the subject of pharmacy practice
and procedure, provided by Bruce Woolley, PhD. Dr. Woolley's testimony is
uncontroverted. Dr. Woolley testified regarding Stewart's actions with respect to one-aday fen-phen, and testified unequivocally that Koeven's actions were not those of a
compounding pharmacist but rather were the actions of a pharmaceutical manufacturer
researching and conducting a clinical trial of an experimental drug. (Record at 824-830.)
The foregoing facts were among the evidence considered by the trial court

in its decision denying Stewart's first summary judgment motion. The Court summarized
its findings of fact as follows:
The Defendant pharmacist combined the prescribed
fenfluramine with other substances: phentermine, which was
prescribed, and a filler and a time-release agent which were
not. The combination of these drugs into a single "one a day"
capsule was the idea of the Defendant and was marketed by
him to patients of local physicians by word of mouth. The
court must assume, and Defendants concede that in
considering this motion, defendants acted as a manufacturer,
[footnote omitted] Defendants provided no warnings to the
Plaintiffs physician about potential side effects, etc. for this
new drug combination. . . . (Record at 1007; see also
Addendum No. 2.)
Based upon the evidence, the Court determined that the jury could find that Koeven acted
not as a pharmacist, but as a manufacturer by "creating and marketing a product not
otherwise available." (Record at 1004.)
Stewart's second motion for summary judgment contended that Stewart's is
entitled, as a matter of law, to indemnification by PCCA, and that given the terms of
Schaerrer's settlement agreement with PCCA, Schaerrer has waived her right to recover
damages from any party obtaining indemnification from PCCA. The relevant provision
in Schaerrer's settlement agreement with PCCA is set forth below in full:
In exchange for the consideration paid to Plaintiff and as part
of the Release granted to PCCA, Plaintiff specifically agrees
that she will not seek to recover from PCCA any damages
attributable to PCCA's proportionate share of fault, if any,
which may be determined under the applicable provisions of
the Utah Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27, et
seq. In addition, Plaintiff agrees that, to the extent that any
party to the lawsuit or any other tort feasor, person, or entity
obtains a final judgment against PCCA for contribution or
indemnity for damage arising from the subject of this
Lawsuit, Plaintiff waives her right to recover from said party,
tort feasor, person, or entity any damages up to and including
the total amount of the judgment against PCCA for
indemnity. Plaintiff further agrees subject to approval of the

court, that PCCA need not participate further in defense of
itself in this action, even for the purpose of having fault
and/or indemnity determined. (Record at 1090; see also
Addendum No. 3)
The trial court ruled that Stewart's was entitled to indemnification as a
matter of law from PCCA, and entered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice of
Schaerrer's claims against Stewart's on that basis.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The primary issue in this appeal is a determination of the proper method for
allocating fault among joint tortfeasors under Utah Law. Utah's Liability Reform Act
(Utah Code Ann. 78-27-37, et seq.) ("the Act") was enacted for the express purpose of
insuring that a party is not held liable to an extent greater than its degree of fault. The
trial court's ruling granting summary judgment was a determination that the common law
doctrine of implied indemnity, rather than the Act, was the proper method for allocating
fault in this case. However, because implied indemnity is, like the Act, a device for
reallocation of damages according to degree of fault, the Act rendered the doctrine of
implied indemnity redundant. Implied indemnity previously had been expressly
recognized by Utah's Comparative Fault Act, which was repealed and replaced by the
Liability Reform Act in 1986. The Liability Reform Act eliminated the express
recognition of indemnity claims, and made that doctrine unnecessary. The trial court
erred in granting summary judgment based upon implied indemnity, because the Act
places the apportionment of liability within the province of the trier of fact.
Even assuming the doctrine of implied indemnity survives and is applicable
after enactment of the Liability Reform Act, the trial court's ruling granting summary
judgment was error under the circumstances of this case. Stewart's is a pharmaceutical
manufacturer subject to strict liability for marketing and selling a defective drug without
adequate warnings. It is not entitled to indemnification under the cases relied upon the
trial court, which require the manufacturer of a product to indemnify a "passive" retailer

or seller of that product in a products liability case. Under the facts of this case, as
explicitly recognized in the trial court's previous order denying summary judgment, there
is evidence in this case from which Stewart's can be found to have been acting as a
pharmaceutical manufacturer, and not merely a passive retailer passing along a defective
product. Moreover, the authorities cited by the trial court in support of its ruling are
inapplicable to this case involving strict products liability claims against a pharmaceutical
manufacturer. The trial court erred in ruling that Stewaifs was entitled to
indemnification by PCCA as a matter of law.
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ARGUMENT
I.

UTAIPS LIABILITY REFORM ACT REPLACED THE COMMON LAW
DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED INDEMNITY AS THE METHOD BY WHICH
LIABILITY IS ALLOCATED AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS
Utah's Liability Reform Act (Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 et. seq.)

(hereinafter referred to as "the Act") was enacted in 1986. At the same time, the Utah
Legislature repealed the Comparative Negligence Act. As argued below, this change in
the law replaced a system that used principles of joint and several liability, contribution
and indemnity to allocate liability among the parties with a statutory scheme giving the
trier of fact the responsibility for making that allocation.
A.

Implied Indemnity Is A Method Of Allocating Liability According To
Degree Of Fault
An examination of the theoretical underpinnings of the doctrine of implied

indemnity is useful to understanding how the Liability Reform Act replaced implied
indemnity. At common law (and indeed under the repealed Utah Comparative
Negligence Act), multiple tortfeasors were jointly and severally liable. One of several
tortfeasors could thereby be held liable for all of a plaintiff s damages, regardless of his
own proportion of the fault. The concepts of contribution and indemnity developed as
ways for jointly and severally liable defendants to recover from one another by shifting
liability according to relative fault. See e ^ , Restatement (3rd) of Torts, Apportionment
of Liability, § 10, comment e, §§ 22-23 (2000).
Contribution is a method by which one tortfeasor may bring a separate
action for recovery from other joint tortfeasors, if the former has been required to pay

damages to a plaintiff in an amount greater than his proportion of fault. Restatement
(3rd) of Torts, Apportionment of Liability, § 23 (2000). Implied indemnity is a related
but distinct doctrine which requires full reimbursement of one tortfeasor by a joint
tortfeasor, where the former has satisfied a common liability. Id., at § 22. The right to
indemnity may arise by statute, by contract, or may be implied at law. Implied indemnity
was generally available to defendants who were only vicariously liable, or who were not
independently culpable for the harm caused to plaintiff. Id. Utah courts have recognized
that implied indemnity arose from equitable principles of restitution, which provide: "A
person who, without personal fault, has become subject to tort liability for the
unauthorized and wrongful conduct of another, is entitled to indemnity from the
other . . . " Restatement of Restitution, § 96 (1937), cited by Hanover, Ltd. v. Cessna
Aircraft Corporation, 758 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Traditionally, implied indemnity and contribution were distinct concepts, in
that indemnity permitted full reimbursement from a co-tortfeasor while contribution
involved some apportionment of damages. However, Utah courts have recognized the
"important, common foundation" of these doctrines: "they attempt to ensure that parties
are not held unfairly liable to an extent greater than their degree of fault." National
Services Industries, Inc. v. B.W. Norton Manufacturing Company, Inc., 937 P.2d 551,
554 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Under a system of joint and several liability, a joint
tortfeasor's only opportunity for a fair distribution of loss was through a contribution or
indemnity action. In Utah this changed with the 1986 enactment of the Liability Reform
Act.

B.

The Liability Reform Act Eliminated The Need For Contribution And
Implied Indemnity Actions.
The question of whether implied indemnity survived enactment of the Act

should first be examined by comparing that Act with the previous statutory scheme. In
1986, the Utah Legislature repealed the Comparative Negligence Act, (Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-37 to § 78-27-43), and replaced it with the Liability Reform Act, (Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-37 to § 78-27-43, as reenacted). Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952, 953
(Utah 1987). The repealed Comparative Negligence Act expressly recognized the
doctrines of joint and several liability and implied indemnity as defining, in part, the
allocation of liability among a plaintiff and several defendants. The former section 7827-41 provided, "Nothing in this Act shall affect (1) the common law liability of the
several joint tortfeasors to have judgment recovered, and payment made, from them
individually by the injured person for the whole injury, (2) any right of indemnity which
may exist under present law... [Emphasis added]"
The entire statutory scheme for allocating liability among joint tortfeasors
contained in the Comparative Negligence Act was repealed and replaced by the Liability
Reform Act. The Liability Reform Act contains no provision like former § 78-27-41(2),
which expressly recognized existing rights of indemnity. The reason for this is clear:
claims of implied indemnity are no longer necessary under a scheme based on the central
tenet that "[n]o defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in
excess of the proportion of fault attributed to that defendant..." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-38(3). In another words, use of implied indemnity to ameliorate the harsh

result of joint and several liability by redistributing loss according to fault is no longer
necessary under a system that, by its very terms, prevents any party from being held
liable for more than its proportionate share of fault. The Utah Legislature's repeal of
former section § 78-27-41(2), and failure to recognize any right of implied indemnity in
enacting the Liability Reform Act, strongly suggests that implied indemnity is now
unnecessary, if not completely eliminated.1
The Utah legislature, by enacting the Liability Reform Act and eliminating
joint and several liability, embraced the "important common foundation" of contribution
and implied indemnity. This foundation is incorporated in the Act which declares in
unambiguous terms that "no defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any
amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to that defendant...." Utah Code
Ann. 78-27-38(3). Instead of the prior system in which joint tortfeasors were jointly and
severally liable and which required contribution or implied indemnity claims to
redistribute the loss, the Act provides for the distribution of loss according to the relative
culpability of potentially responsible parties in a single action. This is accomplished by
requiring the trier of fact to allocate proportion of fault to any person who contributed to
In a pre-Liability Reform Act decision, the Tenth Circuit analyzed whether common
law indemnity survived enactment of Utah's (now-repealed) Comparative Negligence
Act. That court found that a clear majority of other jurisdictions held that adoption of a
comparative negligence scheme "effectively abrogates the theory of indemnity based
upon the active/passive negligence dichotomy.11 Gomez v. American Electric Power
Service Corp. 726 F.2d 649, 652 (10th Cir. 1984). While that court stated its belief that
the Utah Supreme Court might follow the majority rule, it found that common law
indemnity survived in Utah only because of the express exception in the Comparative
Negligence Act. Id. Of course, this express exception has now been repealed, supporting
Schaerrerfs position that implied indemnity has been abrogated in Utah.

i /:

the injury. "In determining the proportional fault attributable to each defendant, the fact
finder may, and when requested by a party shall, consider the conduct of any person who
contributed to the alleged injury . . . " [emphasis added]." § 78-27-38 (4)(a), Utah Code
Ann. Therefore, the Act eliminated joint and several liability in Utah, and expressly
banned contribution suits, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40(2). While the Act does not
expressly eliminate the doctrine of implied indemnity, both the statutory history and the
goals of the Act make clear that implied indemnity, as asserted in this action, is made
redundant by the Act.
A recent Utah Court of Appeals decision explained why contribution suits
are no longer necessary under the Liability Reform Act, and suggests the same with
respect to implied indemnity. In this regard, the court stated, "with the abrogation of
joint and several liability, there remains no need for suits to redistribute loss among joint
tortfeasors because no party will in any case be liable for more than its degree of fault in
the underlying tort action." National Service Industries, 937 P.2d at 555. While not
faced with the question directly, the court explained why implied indemnity actions were
also no longer necessary under the Act, citing to the Restatement of Torts: "In a state
following comparative contribution, or contribution according to the comparative fault of
the parties, contribution may tend to merge with indemnity, and the technical distinctions

Similarly, § 78-27-39 (1) provides that "the trial court may, and when requested by any
party shall direct the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total
amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to
each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any other person whether joined
as a party to the action or not and whose identity is known or unknown to the parties to
the action, including a person immune from suit who contributed to alleged injury."

of indemnity may become less important... The eventual outcome is likely to be a single
remedy based on comparative fault." Id., citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 886A,
Comment 1.
The court also recognized that "any other rule that gives one tortious actor a
right of indemnity from another tortious actor, may be held inapplicable after the
principle of comparative fault has been adopted." Id., citing Prosser & Keeton on Torts,
§ 51 at pg. 343. The court pointed out that while the Act expressly prohibits separate
actions for contribution, it nmust then also prohibit any action separate from the
underlying tort action that seeks to redistribute fault based on degree of fault." Id. This
follows from the dictates of the Act, that allocation of fault should be performed by the
trier of fact in the underlying tort action. It is an express requirement under the Act that
the trier of fault take each tortfeasor's culpability into consideration. (Id. at 555, fn. 2.)
The National Services Industries court's discussion, though not dispositive, clearly calls
into question the continued viability of implied indemnity claims, inasmuch as they are
simply another means of redistributing liability based upon relative degrees of fault.
In short, the Liability Reform Act assigns to the trier of fact the duty of
allocating fault among the parties. Because the trial court's ruling granting summary
judgment prevents the trier of fact from weighing all of the evidence and allocating
proportionate fault among the parties, the ruling was error.
C.

To The Extent The Trial Court Found That The Liability Reform Act
Does Not Apply To Strict Products Liability Actions, The Court Erred
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court rejected the

1 O

argument that the Utah Liability Reform Act eliminated indemnification in the context of
this strict liability claim. (Record at 1156; see also Addendum No. 3) The Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law do not elaborate on this ruling. It appears from the trial
court's comments at the hearing on the underlying motion that it had difficulty
harmonizing the doctrine of implied indemnity with the Liability Reform Act's
comparative fault provisions, yet the court ultimately decided that indemnification was
proper. "I am not satisfied that indemnification is totally abrogated. I am not sure what it
is, because I don't know whether it's been directly and squarely addressed since the
enactment of the comparative fault statute. But I am satisfied that the fundamental
purposes would be satisfied in this case by granting the defendant's motion on his crossclaim [for indemnification]." (Record at 1175, pg. 23:25-24:6) In addition, the trial court
repeatedly suggested at the hearing that it was unsure of the applicability of the Act's
comparative fault provisions to strict liability claims. For example, the court asked "How
can the comparative negligence statute import strict liability and then in the same breath
tell me to apportion negligence if I must instruct the jury that every person who has strict
liability is 100 percent. It makes no sense." (Record at 1175, pg. 11:20-24.) The court
also admitted that it was "really troubled by the application of comparative fault to strict
liability cases. It seems to me to be an irresolvable issue." Id, at 21:12-14.
The Liability Reform Act expressly applies to strict liability claims,
including strict products liability. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(2). This Court has
previously held that comparative fault principles apply in strict products liability actions.
Mulherin v Ingersoll-Rand Co.. 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981). While the Mulherin

decision was rendered before enactment of the Liability Reform Act, a more recent
ii.-., >. •

. .:i.

:..; L .onnrms the plain language of the Act by holding that the

comparative fault provision*; ofthe Art apply cvrn in ilu* ^fnri Inhilnh, i'onli.M I.
Robinson v. Bistrvski. 923 P.2d 1376, H 80 (Utah 1996). In the Robinson case, this
Court hcid thai Uic Acds comparative fault provisions apply to Utah's strict liability dog
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be relieved of putting on c\ idence of a strinlv liable defendant's culpable conduct for
purposes of establishing liability, but alsu recognizes the necessity of introducing such
evidence lor thf pmposes ol 'ippniii
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consistent with the Liability Reform Act, and instead finding that Stewart's is entitled to
implied iiiijeniiun in a mutti'i ol law, this ruling was error.
I!

EVEN IF IMPLIED INDEMNITY WAS NOT ABROGATED BY THE ACT,
STEWART'S IS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION BY PCCA
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
Even if the doctrine of implied indnniiih ih dill ' mMr lolKmni" 1111 •

enactment of the Act, Stewart's has not established that it is entitled to indemnification
fi i" '• v \ ;i

,...ts . - . v.

•* vourt' s ruling granting summary judgment

uii uu& point was eixor. First. given the triiil t onrl' nnln dmviiiij Slmviirf^ fii t moln in
for summary judgment, Stewart's liability in this action, if any, will be that of a
pharmaceutic. ...anuiuaurv..'
'!'- t-"'',r

*
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ihis prevents Stewart's from obtaining indemnity under
'" case |,|IN

11-c 1 b, tin i mini in .-,uj»j.u

uvi:..on

involved factually distinct circumstances. Moreover, the Hanover decision relied on by
the trial court held that a party's right to indemnity should not be determined on summary
judgment, rather it requires findings of the trier of fact. Finally, the court committed
error in its finding that plaintiff was required to present evidence that Stewart's actions
made fenfluramine more dangerous.
A.

As A Pharmaceutical Manufacturer, Stewart's Is Not Entitled To
Indemnification From PCCA
In its earlier motion for summary judgment,3 Stewart's maintained that it

was not subject to strict liability, because of the pharmacist's exception to strict liability.
After briefing and argument, the trial court rejected this position, holding that there "is
evidence in this case from which a jury could find that [Stewart's] stepped from behind
the pharmacist's counter and became a manufacturer by creating and marketing a product
not otherwise available." (Record at 1004; see also, Addendum No. 2). It is necessary,
then, to evaluate the state of products liability law in Utah as it relates to manufacturers
of prescription drugs. In Grundberg v. The Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991), this
Court adopted the "unavoidably unsafe products" exception to strict products liability as
set forth in Comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. at 92.
By adopting Comment k, the Grundberg Court held that design defect claims are
unavailable with respect to prescription drugs. In other words, sellers of prescription
drugs are not subject to strict liability if their products are "properly prepared and

The denial of this motion by the trial court is the subject of Stewart's cross-appeal,
which will be addressed in Schaerrer's Reply brief.

marketed and proper warning is given." Id. However, the Court also expressly
recognized Lhat when filing manufacturers of prescription drugs, "plaintiffs may still
recover under a strict liabilnh claim h\ dnnunslnilnu' thnl lln ptodm I \\iis unreason.iM>
dangerous due to an inadequate warning, a manufacturing flaw, mismarketing or
misrepresenting information 10 the H ; \. id.; see also 813 P.2d at 97, n. 8.
A c cordingly, plaintiff ma> establish that Stew ai t!s is sti ictl) Hal: le ii I tl lis
case by presenting evidence regarding his failure to warn of the risks of the one-a-day
fen-phen capsule, as well as his mismarketing of the product. This evidence, ^v its \ cry
nature, takes Stew art's :)i it : f the i • : le c f the passi v 3 i d . i ^ - .:

isun^ui^nc^ .nis case

from the circumstances under which Stewart's may have been entitle^ • :",de^nific. : : on
from PCCA, as discussed below.
B.

Authority Cited B y T h e Trial ( QUIi„JLLL I'mtlmii liuli 1 iimilica<ii>u Is
Inapplicable To This Case
One of the trial OJUI 1 > vwinJuMons of law is that "in Utah, each entity in

those supplying the defective product, provided the indemnitee did not alter or modify the
product 111 such, a way as to increase its dangerous qualities or to introduce the defect."
Q'-{

*'

-s iiauuvci Liu, v. •^c^iic

758 r* 2d 44 *. 44:-44u (Utah App. 1988); National Service Industries v. Norton, supra,
and a i 95.? J U«M h decision, Rowland Truck v. Everwear, 468 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1985),, in
1

The Hanover case does not stand f u , ! ^ *•• ^- ~-[i
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decision in Hanover discussed the doctrine of implied indemnity in the context of strict
products liability actions by pointing out the difference in culpability between passive
suppliers, distributors and retailers as compared to the manufacturer of a product. In the
Hanover case, the manufacturer was Cessna Aircraft Company. The retailer seller
seeking indemnity was an authorized Cessna airplane dealer. The court's recognition of
the concept of implied indemnity4 was premised upon the same public policy supporting
strict products liability, ij^, "to place the loss caused by a defective product on those who
create the risk and reap the profit by placing a product in the stream of commerce." IdL,
citing Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Williams, 330 N.E.2d 857, 860 (1975). Under strict
products liability, of course, even "passive" retailers may be held liable for selling a
defective product. As the court recognized, the concept of implied indemnity prevents
the passive retailer from being held derivatively or vicariously liable for the wrongful act
of the manufacturer. Hanover, 758 P.2d at 446. The Hanover decision is replete with
references to "active" vs. "passive" wrongdoing, ultimately holding that the applicability
of implied indemnity turns on this distinction. Id., at 447-48. Importantly, the Hanover
court also held that the trial court's grant of summary judgment, ruling that the airplane
dealer was entitled to indemnification, was premature. Id. at 450. The court held that the
trier of fact must determine, among other things, whether the retailer was in fact "simply
4

The Hanover decision does not mention the Liability Reform Act, but it appears that the
underlying injury and subsequent lawsuit predated the Reform Act. (The underlying case
is identified as a Third District court case, Salt Lake County Civil No. C82-4799,
suggesting that the underlying action was initiated in 1982.) The Liability Reform Act's
elimination of joint and several liability and implied indemnity is not applicable to
injuries occurring prior to its effective dates, i ^ , April 28, 1986. Stephens v. Henderson,
741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987).

an innocent, passive link in the chain of commerce before it can be determined that [it]
<,|i .iiilil IN; iniit'iiiiiilir'l
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.. .;.... court's m o t i o n g r a n t i n g

summary judgment to Stewart's should be reversed. 3
The facts of this case simply do not support application of a rule requiring
ai 1 activ e manufacti irei to indemnify a passi\ c retaiici. iia.^cd upon the evidence,
Stewart's can in no way be eharactonVod a •; .1 "pns-iiv '"" ivlniln onlitlod 1
indemnification from PCCA, the wholesaler which supplied bulk fenfluramine to
Stewart - 1 Hi euaenec 01 ihis case, as sei iorth in the Statement of Facts, shows that
Stev ::"4

*

,

. .

.

nluct, the one-a-day

fen-phen capsule. It created samples and provided them, unsolicited, to local doctors to
"try out' on their patients. The record contains undisputed expert evidence that Stewart's
acti\ ities vs ere those of aphai 111a.ee itical 1 nanufa.. jrer, and the ;,,ji L^UTI pre\ iuu-lv
found that Stewart's is subject to strict liability becau
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as a passive retailer who happened to be in the chain of distribution, in order 1^ establish
s

^

. a manufacturer, pi a 11 a 1 i i * w ill put on evidence relating

to Stewart's activities in developing its foil plion oaps'ulr ik rflnrts (m maiket lh.ii pill
and its failure to adequately test
TK^ •
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r t-.> warn doctors of the risk of using the medication.
p;;ione uiaiier cnii.icu ••.• UJJ,..unificationby another

who has manufactured the product. ' .
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The National Services case does not support mo 1; ^ . -:, A twi^
aw that
"each entity in the claim, of distribution . . . is entitled to . . .indemn
^ J ; I / ' That case
simply discussed the history of the doctrine of implied indemnity, and cited Hanover as
an example of implied indemnity. Finally, the Florida case cited by the trial court, in.
si ipport of its ruling, Rowland Truck Equipment, Inc., is not controlling on this Court.

actual wrongdoing, or lack of it, that determine its right to indemnity. In this case, there
is evidence of Stewart's actual wrongful conduct, e.g., in failing to properly warn of the
risks of its product which, are central to plaintiffs claims. Under these circumstances,
Stewart's is simply not entitled to indemnification; at a minimum, this is an issue for the
trier of fact.
C.

Plaintiff Is Not Required To Put On Evidence Of Increased Risk
Created By Stewart's Actions
The trial court's conclusions of law are based in part upon its conclusion

that "no evidence has been submitted to the court to establish that Stewart's in any way
altered or increased the danger of the fenfluramine supplied to it by PCCA before it was
consumed by the plaintiff." (Record at 1156.) It is clear from the court's written
conclusions of law, as well as its ruling at the hearing on this motion, that the purported
lack of evidence regarding Stewart's alteration or increasing the danger of the
fenfluramine is central to the trial court's order granting summary judgment. (Record at
1175, p. 23:15-24:10.) As an initial matter, the presence or absence of such evidence is
not determinative of plaintiff s ability to establish a strict liability claim against
Stewart's, as discussed above, and the issue was not before the trial court in any event.
Moreover, the trial court's conclusion misstates the evidence which would
be necessary to a determination on Stewart's right to indemnification, assuming the
Hanover decision applied. There is ample evidence of Stewart's own conduct, other than
altering or increasing the danger of the drug, which was before the trial court and which
Schaerrer should be permitted to present to a jury. This evidence would clearly deprive

Stewart's of the right of indemnit) , if" the Hanover decision is found to be the controlling
\c\.u\\ standard

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, pinritiff ».- j

.• :

,•

respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's April 30, 2001 order and
j.iuL.meiiL granting Stewan .-. iii^:.*-i ;^J summar) judgment and dismissing Schaerrer's
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ADDENDUM

Tabl

UTAH LIABILITY REFORM ACT

•N .% . : , 78-27-37 throu^ 76-^;-43:
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person immune from suit as
defined in Subsection PV \vl * - . iiumL>i i»- ^ ..ai.., uxause ot ..ifcli. :. ai

:

i

(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person seeking
recovery, including negligent i m .ill ils degrees, enmp»ihili\<i iiejijigeine, ass
risk, strict liability, breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability,
and misuse, modification, or abuse of a product.
(3)

Person immune t • .
i

- i •. \ • -•• immune from suit under Title 34A, Chapter 3,

Workers' Compensation Act, or Chapter 3a, Utah Occupational Disease Act; and
• (b) a governmental entity or governmental employee IIIIILILIIK1 I mm
suit pursuant tr 1. I itlr A\ (Inpln VI, i unvi iinipnl'il Immunity Act.
(4) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or
reimbursement on its own beliait, or on behall oi »;.i^u^i iur w nun; i. , • ^numi./_-*

:

as legal represenhtis r
78-27-38 Comparative Negligence:
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not along bar recovery by
that person.

(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any defendant or group of
defendants whose fault, combined with the fault of persons immune from,, suit, exceeds
I lie km 11 <il the | it i so 11 ,» rl.m " iuo\ en pun In ;mi tea lineal ion ol Inn 11 nude indn
Subsection 78-27-39(2).
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount
In excess of the proportion, of :,;is:. .: \ •.

x:l to that defendant I mder Section 78-27 39.

(-I i I „i i In ili'kTinining the proportionate fault attributable to each
defendant, the fact finder may, and when requested by a party shall, consider the conduct
of any person who contributed to the alleged injur
person immune lioni sml ni . Irlrm

l

. .:: •.

• *'llu'i llic prison \; ,i

* -\c*:* • .• • • r allocate fault to each

person seeking recovery, to each defendant and u i \ ither person whether joined as a
party to the action or not and whose ideiuitv is known or unknown to the parties to the
a . : ;

•••

* •

in

the case of a motor vehicle accident involving an unidentified motor vehicle, the
existence of the \ chicle shall be proven by clear and convincing evidence which, may
consist solely of one person's testimony
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune from suit is considered only
to accurately determine the fault of the person, seeking recovery and. a defendant any may

ill this or ai i>< other action.

78-27-39 Separate Special Verdicts On Total Damages And Proportion of Fault:
("N The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the

sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person seeking
recovery, to each defendant, and to any other person whether joined as a party to the
action or not and who identity is known to the parties to the action,, including a person
illinium' from suil \>lio i onh iiinifnt In the iilinied nnfiii r.
(2) (a) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault attributed to all
person immune from smi .- •.

man40%, n. uiai ,wiu, .,..,,.. ^ ; ^ v . aiat percentage or

^tiivi' parties in proportion to the percentage or proportion of fault initially attributed to
each party by the tact findfT

A

5c r +h\s reallocation, cumulative fault shall equal 100%
i

;

•-

:

l

.

'• ii" the combined percentage or proportion of fault attributes iu aAA
persons immune irom suit is 40% or more, that percentage or proportion of fault
atti ib uted to persons immune worn ?\v* iiiay not be i edu : ecl undei Subsec tion (2) (a).
The inr\ nriv not be advised of the effect of any reallocation
under Subsection (2).
(ii) ' I he jury may be ad\ ised that fai ill: atti ibi ited tc pen: son ii nri i i u: me
from,, suit may redi ice the aw ard of the person seeking recovery.
(3) A person immune from suit may not be held liable, based on the
allocation o\ Idu-L m in is or any other action.

78-27-40 Amount of Liability Limited To Proportion of Fault - - No Contribution:
(1) Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a
defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion
of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that
defendant.
(2) A defendant is not entitled to contribution from any other person.
(3) A defendant or person seeking recovery may not bring a civil action
against any person immune from suit to recovery damages resulting from the allocation
of fault under Section 78-27-38.
78-27-41 Joinder of Defendants:
(1) A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the
litigation, may joint as a defendant, in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, any person other than a person immune from suit who may have caused or
contributed to the injury or damage from which recovery is sought, for the purpose of
having determined their respective proportions of fault.
(2) A person immune from suit may not be named as a defendant, but fault
may be allocated to a person immune from suit solely for the purpose of accurately
determining the fault of the person seeking recovery and a defendant. A person immune
from suit is not subject to any liability, based on the allocation of fault, in this or any
other action.
(3) (a) A person immune from suit may intervene as a party under Rule
24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, regardless of whether or not money damages are

sought.
(b) A person immune from suit who intervenes in an action may not be
held liable for any fault allocated to that person under Section 78-27-38.
(4) A party seeking to allocate fault shall identify in its answer those
persons then known to that party who may be at fault and shall identify within a
reasonable time any additional persons later discovered to have been at fault.
78-27-42 Release To One Defendant Does Not Discharge Other Defendants:
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants
does not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JEANNE SCHAERRER,
Petitioner

:
:

ORDER DENYING SUMMARY

:

Date: September 1,2000

JUDGMENT
vs.

PROFESSIONAL COMPOUNDING
:
Case Number: 980406564
CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC, et al,
Respondents
:
Division V: Judge James R. Taylor
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy and Stewart
Koeven's (Defendant Stewart) motion for summary judgment. The Utah Supreme Court has
given the court the following guidelines for making a ruling of summary judgment:
If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the [non-moving] party. Thus, the court must evaluate
all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in the
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Wilkinson v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co.. 975 P.2d 464,465 (Utah 1998) quoting Bowen v. Riverton City. 656
P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982).
Additionally, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure contain this rule for making a ruling of
sumfnary judgment:
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The court will now recite the facts and inferences that it relies on according to the

Page 1 of

6

100

aforementioned guidelines to make its decision to deny summary judgment for Defendants
Stewart Koeven, and Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy. The Defendant pharmacist combined the
prescribed fenfluramine with other substances: phentermine, which was prescribed, and a filler and
a time-release agent which were not. Combination of these drugs into a single "one a day"
capsule was the idea of the Defendant and was marketed by him to patients of local physicians by
word of mouth. The court must assume, and Defendants concede that in considering this motion,
defendants acted as a manufacturer.1 Defendants provided no warnings to the PiaintiflPs physician
about potential side effects, etc., for this new drug combination. Defendants could not have
known without testing whether the fenfluramine would be released over a period of time as
intended.2 For the purposes of this motion it is assumed that sufficient evidence is available to
establish a causative link between the fenfluramine ingested by the Plaintiff and her physical
ailment.
The Plaintiff argues that because the Defendant pharmacist "manufactured" a new
product, he is strictly liable to the Defendant for any harm as if he had originally manufactured the
fenfluramine itself. The Defendant counters that since there is no evidence that the drug in
capsulated combination with other ingredients caused any harm that would not have occurred
from ingestion in the fashion expected by the primary supplier of fenfluramine, the general
exclusion of pharmacists from theories of strict liability applicable to a manufacturer of the drug
should apply in this case. The earliest case that the court can find that exempts a pharmacist from

1

See quotation of Statutory definition and discussion infra.

2

See uncontroverted testimony of Dr. Wooley at page 12 of Plaintiffs Memo in
Opposition to Summary Judgment.
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strict liability is McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co.. 174 So2d 736 (Fla 1965). The original claim was
one of implied warranty of fitness, but the Florida Supreme Court recognized that the action was
also based on the concept of strict liability.3 The court noted that comment k4 of § 402 A of the
Restatement 2d of Torts provides for an exception to strict liability for pharmacists under these
same conditions. The court also noted that applying strict liability to pharmacists would result in
their becoming insurers of the safety of drugs manufactured by others.5 The Restatement of the
Law Third, Torts-Product Liability § 6 (e) and comment h also recognize the pharmacy
exception, noting a couple of exceptions:
(e) A retail seller or other distributor of a prescription drug or medical device is
subject to liability for harm caused by the drug or device if:
(1) at the time of sale or other distribution the drug or medical device contains

3

McLeod at 739.

4

The court recognizes that courts have interpreted this comment in different ways. Here
is the text of the comment:
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are
especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur
treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when
it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the
use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they
involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is
not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and
the like, many of which for this veiy reason cannot legally be sold except to phj'sicians, or under the
prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which,
because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance
of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the
marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such
products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper
warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate
consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an
apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
5

MsLeod at 739.
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a manufacturing defect as defined in § 2(a); or
(2) at or before the time of sale or other distribution of the drug or medical
device the retail seller or other distributor fails to exercise reasonable care and
such failure causes harm to persons,
h. Liability of retail seller of prescription drugs and medical devices for defective
designs and defects due to inadequate instructions or warnings. The rule governing
most products imposes liability on wholesalers and retailers for selling a defectively
designed product, or one without adequate instructions or warnings, even though they
have exercised reasonable care in marketing the product. See § 1, Comment e, and
§ 2, Comment o. Courts have refused to apply this general rule to nonmanufacturing
retail sellers of prescription drugs and medical devices and, instead, have adopted the
rule stated in Subsection (e). That rule subjects retailers to liability only if the product
contains a manufacturing defect or if the retailer fails to exercise reasonable care in
connection with distribution of the drug or medical device. In so limiting the liability
of intermediary parties, courts have held that they should be permitted to rely on the
special expertise ofmanufacturers, prescribing and treating health-care providers, and
governmental regulatory agencies. They have also emphasized the needs of medical
patients to have ready access to prescription drugs at reasonable prices.
The Coyle case also cites the following cases as refusing to apply strict liability to
pharmacists: Raynor v. Richardson-Merrell. Inc.. 643 F.Supp. 238 (D.D.C.1986); Ramirez v.
Richardson-Merrell Inc.. 628 F.Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons. 40
Cal.3d 672, 221 Cal.Rptr. 447, 710 P.2d 247 (1985); Ullman v. Grant. 114 Misc.2d 220, 450
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1982); Batiste v. American Home Products Corp., 32N.C.App. 1, 231 S.E.2d 269
(1977); Bichlerv. Willing. 58 A.D.2d 331, 397N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977).6
The Plaintiff argues that because the pharmacist stepped out of the traditional role of
receiving and filling prescriptions he becomes strictly liable for harm that might resultfromthe
noxious substance. The burden of strict liability and the duty to warn of defects is placed upon
manufacturers to encourage careful testing, research and warnings that precede or accompany the

6

Covle v. Richardson-Merrell Inc.. 584 A.2d 1383 (PA 1991) at 1387-1388.
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product into the marketplace.7 The Pharmacist in this case wants the best of both worlds. He
wants the economic profit from making a desirable product available for sale but wants to avoid
the testing, research, and warning responsibility that generally attach to the introduction of a new
product. The court cannot distinguish between the Defendant Stewart as a manufacturer and
other named defendants, who are acknowledged manufacturers but who are not the manufacturers
of the original fenfluramine powder. These other manufacturers merely purchased fenfluramine
powder and put it into a pill or capsule form. They cannot escape liability under the doctrine of
strict liability for manufacturers of defective or dangerous products and neither should Defendants
Stewart if he acted as a manufacturer.
No regulated or controlled substance is intended to be sold without an intervening
physician's prescription. Nevertheless, a manufacturer may still be strictly liable for a dangerous
or defective product. There simply is no good reason not to apply the same standards to this
Defendant. There is evidence in this casefromwhich a jury couldfindthat he stepped from
behind the pharmacist's counter and became a manufacturer by creating and marketing a product
not otherwise available. The Utah Code gives this definition of manufacturing, which appears to
encompass what Defendant Stewart did:
(22) "Manufacture":
(a) means the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion, or
processing of a prescription drug or a device, either directly or indirectly . . . and
includes any packaging or repackaging of a substance or labeling or relabeling of its
container; {U.C.A. 58-17a-102 (22). Definitions.}
Something in the product appears to have had negative physical consequences. The pharmacist

7

For example see Covle v. Richardson-Merrell. Inc.. 584 A.2d 1383 (PA 1991) at 1387,
which states that strict liability provides an incentive to safety.
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exception to the doctrines of strict liability and a manufacturer's duty to warn does not apply in
this case. The motion for summary judgment is denied.
Dated this 1st day of September, 2000

Judge James R. Taylcor
Fourth Judicial Distria
Distri
Copies of this Order mailed to:
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Counsel for the Respondent:
Mailed this

j

day of f\ KM , 2000, postage pre-paid as noted above.
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JEANNE SCHAERRER,
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CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC.,
STEWART'S PLAZA PHARMACY, INC.,
STEWART KOEVEN, R.PH., JEFFREY W.
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Judge James Taylor

Defendants.

On or about November 29, 2000, defendants Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy and
.tewart Koeven (hereinafter "Stewart's"), by and through their counsel of record, Michael P.
accheo, RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON, submitted to the court a Motion for Summary
dgment, supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities, along with certain exhibits.

Thereafter, plaintiff, by and through her counsel of record, Richard M.. Franco, LlEFF,
CABRASER, HEIMANN

& BERNSTEIN, LLP, and Charles F. Abbott,

ABBOTT & WALKER,

submitted

a Memorandum in Opposition to Stewart's Motion for Summary Judgment and Stewart's, by and
through counsel, submitted a Reply Memorandum. On Thursday, January 25, 2001, the court
heard oral argument from Mr. Zaccheo on behalf of Stewart's, and Mr. Franco, on behalf of the
plaintiff, regarding Stewart's Motion for Summary Judgment. After consideration of the parties'
memoranda, oral argument, and applicable Utah law, the court enters the following Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment pursuant to Rules 52, and 56, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Rule 4-504, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.
FINDINGS OF FACTS
Based upon the pleadings, the evidence submitted to the court by the parties, the
admissions of counsel, and the court's prior findings, the court hereby finds that the following
facts are uncontroverted and that no material issue of fact remains regarding the following:
1.

The plaintiff Jeanne Schaerrer on several occasions purchased the drug

fenfluramine from defendant Stewart's. All of the fenfluramine supplied to Jeanne Schaerrer by
Stewart's was purchased by Stewart's from defendant Professional Compounding Centers of
America ("PCCA").
2.

Stewart's combined the fenfluramine purchased from PCCA, with the drug

phentermine and a time-release agent to create a one-a-day "phen-fen" capsule. It was in the form

2

ii

of this capsule that Stewart's supplied fenfluramine to Jeanne Schaerrer. No evidence has been
submitted to the court which would support an inference that the combining of fenfluramine,
phentermine and a time-release agent in a single capsule altered or affected the fenfluramine in any
way. No evidence has been submitted to the court that would support an inference that Stewart's
altered, in any way material to this action, the fenfluramine that was purchased from PCCA and
was ultimately consumed by the plaintiff. The fenfluramine supplied by Stewart's was in no way
more dangerous or more likely to cause injury to the plaintiff than was fenfluramine supplied to
the plaintiff by, for example, defendant American Home Products, which was not combined in a
single capsule with phentermine or any other substance. This finding was also made by the court
in connection with an earlier motion for summary judgment submitted by Stewart's and is
reflected in the court's rulings of September 1, 2000, and October 18, 2000, denying Stewart's
Motion for Summary Judgment and granting partial summary judgment, respectively. The court's
Order of September 1, 2000, and the court's Order of October 18, 2000, are both incorporated
into these findings and conclusions as if fully set forth.
3.

Plaintiff has alleged in her Complaint that she sustained injury as a result of

having ingested the drug fenfluramine and that Stewart's is liable based upon theories of
negligence and strict products liability. Based upon the court's ruling of October 18, 2000,
plaintiffs only remaining cause of action against Stewart's is based upon strict product liability.

3
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4.

In this case, in order to recover based upon the theory of strict product

liability, the jury would have to conclude that Stewart's was a manufacturer with regard to the
fenfluramine supplied to the plaintiff. For purposes of these findings of fact, conclusions of law
and judgment, the court has assumed that the jury would indeed conclude that Stewart's was a
manufacturer. As a manufacturer, Stewart's would be liable for a defect, if any, in the drug
fenfluramine which it supplied to the plaintiff.
5.

For purposes of this motion, the court has assumed that the plaintiff would

be able to meet her burden to establish that the drug fenfluramine was defective as that term is
defined under Utah law for purposes of strict product liability.
6.

On or about January 19, 2000, the plaintiff executed a Release and

Settlement Agreement with defendant PCCA. In pertinent part, the Release provided as follows:
III.
PLAINTIFF'S AGREEMENT AND WAIVER AS TO CLAIMS AGAINST PCCA
FOR CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
(READ CAREFULLY)
In exchange for the consideration paid to Plaintiff and as part of the
Release granted to PCCA, Plaintiff specifically agrees that she will
not seek to recover from PCCA any damages attributable to
PCCA's proportionate share of fault, if any, which may be
determined under the applicable provisions of the Utah Liability
Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27, et seq. In addition, Plaintiff
agrees that, to the extent that any party to the lawsuit or any other
tort feasor, person, or entity obtains afinaljudgment against PCCA
for contribution or indemnity for damage arising from the subject of
this Lawsuit, Plaintiff waives her right to recover from said party,
4
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tort feasor, person, or entity any damages up to and including the
total amount of the judgment against PCCA for indemnity. Plaintiff
further agrees subject to approval of the court, that PCCA need not
participate further in defense of itself in this action, even for the
purpose of having fault and/or indemnity determined.

7.

On or about February 8, 1999, Stewart's filed a Cross-Claim against

defendant PCCA. The Cross-Claim asserted that Stewart's had a right of common-law
indemnification against PCCA in the event that the fenfluramine supplied by PCCA to Stewart's
was determined to be defective After plaintiff settled with PCCA, plaintiffs claims against
PCCA were, by stipulation, dismissed by the court The Cross-Claim of Stewart's against PCCA
was not dismissed.
8.

Neither in her Memorandum in Opposition to Stewart's Motion for

Summary Judgment, nor at oral argument, did plaintiff contest the validity of the provision of the
PCCA Release which is quoted herein. No evidence was submitted to the court to suggest that
the terms of the PCCA Release should not be enforced according to the ordinary meaning of its
plain and unambiguous terms.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The court hereby adopts the following conclusions of law:
1.

The court hereby incorporates all conclusions of law set forth in the court's

Orders of September 1, 2000, denying Stewart's Motion for Summary Judgment, and October 18,
2000, granting partial summary judgment to Stewart's.
5
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2.

The pertinent provision of the PCCA Release is unambiguous and

enforceable according to its plain terms. Pursuant to the terms of the Release, plaintiff agreed to
waive any right to recovery from any party that obtained a judgment of indemnification against
PCCA. Therefore, if Stewart's is entitled in this matter to indemnification from PCCA for
damages awarded to the plaintiff, then plaintiff has agreed to waive her right to recover from
Stewart's.
3.

In Utah, each entity in the chain of distribution of a defective product is

entitled to obtain indemnification from those supplying the defective product, provided the
indemnitee did not alter or modify the product in such a way as to increase its dangerous qualities
or to introduce the defect.1 Resolving every reasonable inference in plaintiffs favor, no evidence
has been submitted to the court to establish that Stewart's in any way altered or increased the
danger of the fenfluramine supplied to it by PCCA before it was consumed by the plaintiff. The
court finds that as a matter of law Stewart's would be entitled to indemnification from PCCA for
any defect in the drug fenfluramine which was consumed by the plaintiff.
4.

The court rejects plaintiffs argument that the enactment of the Utah

Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-37, 38 (1999) eliminated indemnification as
it applies in this case to PCCA and Stewart's in the context of a strict product liability claim.

l

See Hanover Ltd. v. Cissna, 758 P.2d 443, 445-446 (Utah App. 1988); National Serv. Indus. V.
D. W. Norton, 937 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1997). This also appears to be the law in the majority of the
states. Hanover, 758 P.2d at 446; Roland Truck v. Everwear, 468 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1985).
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5.

Having determined that Stewart's is entitled as a matter of law to judgment

against PCCA for indemnity for damages awarded to Jeanne Schaerrer as a result of her
remaining strict product liability claims, the court further finds that pursuant to the terms of the
PCCA Release, plaintiff would inevitably be required to waive her right to recover from Stewart's
any damages arising from a defect in the drug fenfluramine. The court determines that requiring
Stewart's and the plaintiff to conduct a long and expensive trial would be wasteful and inefficient
and would inevitably, if the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining a favorable verdict, result in plaintiff
waiving her right to recover from Stewart's. Therefore, the court grants summary judgment in
Stewart's favor, dismissing plaintiffs only remaining claim, that of strict product liability, with
prejudice and on the merits, each party to bear their owns costs and attorneys' fees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Having considered the arguments of the parties, and having entered findings of fact
and conclusions of law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Stewart's
Motion for Summary Judgment filed on or about November 29, 2000, is granted, and plaintiffs
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Complaint against Stewart's is dismissed, with prejudice and on the merits, each party to bear
their own costs and attorneys' fees.

Richard M. Franco
Attorneys Plaintiff Jeanne Schaerrer
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I JffiREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this I st * day of \<z.tJLx^£*y(
, 2001, to the
following:
Charles F. Abbott
Scott Walker
ABBOTT & WALKGR
3651 North 100 gast, Suite 300
Provo, Utah 84604
Richard Heimann
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LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN

Embarcadero Center West
275 Battery Street, 30th Floor
San Francisco, California 94111-3339
Telephone (415) 956-1000

Craig N. Hentschel
Michael H. Walizer
ARNOLD & PORTER

777 Figueroa St, 44th
Los Angeles, CA 90017-5844
Dennis C. Ferguson
WILLIAMS & HUNT

257 East 200 South, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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